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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY RAPE:
MICHAEL v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
SONOMA COUNTY
I. INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions, "carnal knowledge of a female under a
stated age [has been] made a crime by statute."' This offense, com-
monly known as statutory rape, to distinguish it from common law for-
cible rape, refers to the act of sexual intercourse with a female under a
certain age. While proof of the crime hinges on the female's age, the
age of the male is generally irrelevant. Further, whereas consent oper-
ates as a defense to forcible rape, the consent of an underage female
may not be employed as a defense to statutory rape.2 Instead, the mi-
nor female is conclusively presumed to be incapable of understanding
the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse.3  The purpose of
such statutes, although recently subject to wide debate and criticism,
was originally envisioned to be the "preservation of the chastity of mi-
nor females."4
In recent years, a substantial majority of states has enacted gender-
neutral statutory rape laws.5 California, as well as a number of other
1. 65 AM. Jui. 2d Rape § 15 (1972).
2. State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, -, 204 P.2d 448, 450 (1949); People v. Marks, 130
N.Y.S. 524, 525, 146 A.D. 11, 12 (1911); Murphy v. State, 120 Ind. 115, 115, 22 N.E. 106, 106
(1889).
3. 65 AM. JuR. 2d Rape § 16 (1972).
4. K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTicE 5 (1974). See Parsons v. Parker, 160 Va. 810, 813-14, 170
S.E. 1, 2 (1933).
5. The following forty-two states have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape provisions.
Only a minority of jurisdictions, however, employ the term "rape" in their statutory language.
Instead, the offense is designated sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual conduct with a minor, or
unlawful sexual intercourse. Listed below are those provisions dealing with unlawful sexual inter-
course with a victim under a specified age resulting in a felony: Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.41.410(a)(3), (a)(4)(A),(B), .440(a)(1) (Supp. 1981) (Sexual assault is committed when the
victim is less than 13 and the actor is 16 or older, or when the victim is less than 18 and is
entrusted to the care of the actor who is 18 or older. Sexual abuse of a minor is committed when
the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor is 16 or older.); Arizona, ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-1404, -1405(A) (1978) (Sexual abuse is committed when the victim is less than 15.
Sexual conduct with a minor is committed when the victim is less than 18.); Arkansas, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1803(c) (1977) (Rape is committed when the victim is less than 11.); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(l)(e), (1)(f), -405(1) (1978) (Sexual assault is committed when the victim is
less than 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim, or when the victim is less than 18
and the actor is the victim's guardian. Sexual assault on a child is committed when the victim is
less than 15 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim.); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
1
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states, territories, and the federal government, has retained gender-
STAT. ANN. § 53a-71 (West Supp. 1981) (Sexual assault is committed when the victim is less than
15.); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 762(b) (Sexual misconduct is committed when the vic-
tim is less than 16 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim.); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.05(1) (West 1976) (Carnal intercourse with an unmarried person is committed when
the victim is less than 18.); Hawaii, HAWAn REv. STAT. §§ 707-730(l)(b), -731(l)(b) (Supp. 1980)
(Rape in the first degree is committed when the victim is less than 14 and receives serious bodily
injury. Minus such injury, the charge is rape in the second degree.); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 11-4(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Indecent liberties with a child is committed when the victim is
less than 16 and the actor is 17 or older.); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-3(a), (c) (Burns
Supp. 1981) (Child molesting is committed when the child is less than 12, or when the child is at
least 12 but not yet 16 and the actor is 16 or older.); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.3(2), .4(3),(4),
(5) (West 1979) (Sexual abuse in the second degree is committed when the victim is less than 12.
Sexual abuse in the third degree is committed when the victim is a child (undefined by statute), or
when the victim is 14 or 15 and a member of the same household as the actor, or when the actor is
at least 6 years older than the victim who is 14 or 15.); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503(l)(a), -
3504(a) (Supp. 1979) (Indecent liberties with a child or ward is committed when the victim is less
than 16.); Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 510.040(1)(b)2, .050(1), .060(1)(b) (1975) (Rape in the first
degree is committed when the victim is less than 12. Rape in the second degree is committed
when the actor is at least 18 and the victim is less than 14. Rape in the third degree is committed
when the actor is at least 21 and the victim is less than 16.); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.42(3) (West Supp. 1981) (Aggravated rape is committed when the victim is less than 12.);
Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 252(1)(A), 254(1) (Supp. 1981) (Rape is committed
when the victim is less than 14. Sexual abuse of a minor is committed when the actor is 19, the
victim is less than 14 but not yet 16, and the actor is at least 5 years older than the victim.);
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art 27, §§ 463(a)(3), 464B(a)(3) (Supp. 1981) (Second degree rape is
committed when the victim is less than 14 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim. A
third degree sexual offense is committed when a person engages in sexual contact with a person
less than 14. The actor must be at least 4 years older than the victim.); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN.
LAW ANN. ch. 252, § 22A (West Supp. 1970 to 1980) (Rape is committed when the victim is less
than 16.); Michigan, MICH. Cow. LAWS §§ 750.520b(1)(a) and (b), .520d(1)(a) (Supp. 1968 to
1981) (First degree criminal sexual conduct is committed when the victim is less than 13, or when
the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor is of the same household. Third degree
criminal sexual conduct is committed when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16.); Minnesota,
MDiN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342(a) and (b), .344(a)(3) (West Supp. 1981) (First and second degree
criminal sexual conduct are committed when the victim is less than 13, and the actor is more than
36 months older than the victim, or when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor, who
is more than 48 months older than the victim, is in a position of authority over the victim. Third
degree criminal sexual conduct is committed when the victim is less than 13 and the actor is no
more than 36 months older than the victim, or when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and
actor is more than 24 months older than the victim.); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030(3), .040,
.050 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1981) (Rape is committed when the victim is less than 14. First degree
sexual assault is committed when the victim is 14 or 15. Second degree sexual assault is commit-
ted when the actor is at least 17 and the victim is 16.); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
503(l)(3) (1979) (Sexual intercourse without consent is committed when the victim is less than 16
and the actor is at least 3 years older than the victim.); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-319(l)(c)
(1979) (First degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is less than 16 and the actor is at
least 19.); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A'2(X), (XI) (Supp. 1979) (Aggravated
felonious sexual assault is committed when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor is
of the same household or related by blood, or when the victim is less than 13.); New Jersey, NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2a.(1), (2)(a)-(c), c.(4),(5) (West Supp. 1980) (Aggravated sexual assault is
committed when the victim is less than 13, or when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the
actor is related to the victim by blood or has supervisory capacity over the victim or is a guardian
of the victim. Sexual assault is committed when the victim is at least 16 but not yet 18 and the
actor is of the victim's household, or when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor is at
least 4 years older than the victim.); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1 I(A)(1), B(l) (1978)
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based statutory rape provisions. 6 While the purported rationale behind
(Criminal sexual penetration in the first degree is committed when the victim is less than 13.
Criminal sexual penetration in the second degree is committed when the victim is less than 16 and
the actor holds a position of authority over the child.); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-
27.2(a)(1), -27.7 (1981) (First degree rape is committed when the victim is less than 12 and the
actor is at least 12 and is at least 4 years older than the victim. Unlawful sexual intercourse is
committed when the victim is a minor (undefined) and the actor has assumed a parental position
over the victim.); North Dakota, N.D. CETrr. CODE § 12.1-20-03(l)(d) (Supp. 1981) (Gross sexual
imposition is committed when the victim is less than 15.); Ohio, OHIo REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2907.02(A)(3), .04(A) (Baldwin 1979) (Rape is committed when the victim is less than 13. Cor-
ruption of a minor is committed when the victim is at least 12 but not over 15 and the actor is at
least 18.); Oklahoma, 1981 OKLA. SEss. LAWS ch. 325 (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,§§ 1111(1), 1114(A)(1)) (Rape is committed when the victim is less than 16. First degree rape is
committed when the victim is less than 14 and the actor is at least 18.); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT.§§ 163.435(1)(a),(b),(c) (1979) (Contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor (a misde-
meanor) is committed when the victim is less than 18 and the actor is at least 18.); Pennsylvania,
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3122 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (Statutory rape is committed when the
victim is less than 14 and the actor is at least 18.); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2(A), -6
(1981 & Supp. 1981) (First degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is less than 13.
Third degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 16 and the actor
is older than 18.); South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 16-3-655(l)(3) (Supp. 1980) (First degree criminal
sexual conduct is committed when the victim is less than 11 and the actor is at least 3 years older
than the victim. Second degree criminal sexual conduct is committed when the victim is at least
11 but not more than 14 and the actor is at least 3 years older than the victim. Third degree
criminal sexual conduct is committed when the victim is at least 14 but not yet 16 and the actor
holds a position of familial or official authority over the victim.); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIW
LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-1(I)(4),(5) (Supp. 1981) (Second degree rape is committed when the victim is
less than 10. Third degree rape is committed when the victim is less than 15.); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3703(4) (Supp. 1981) (Aggravated rape is committed when the victim is less than
14.); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-401(1), -401(2) (Supp. 1981) (Unlawful sexual intercourse is
committed when the victim is less than 16. Rape is committed when the victim is less than 14.);
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(3) (Supp. 1981) (Sexual assault is committed when the
victim is less than 16.); Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 18.2-63, -64.1 (Supp. 1981) (Carnal knowledge of a
child is committed when the victim is at least 13 but not yet 15. When the actor is a minor and the
victim, who is less than 3 years younger than the actor, consents, the actor is guilty only of fornica-
tion. Carnal knowledge of a ward of the state is committed when the minor victim is institution-
ally confined and is at least 15 and the actor is one who provides services to juveniles under state
authority. If the minor victim is less than 3 years younger than the actor, the actor is guilty only of
fornication.); Washington, WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.070, .080, .090 (Supp. 1981) (First
degree statutory rape is committed when the victim is less than 11 and the actor is at least 13.
Second degree statutory rape is committed when the victim is at least 11 but not yet 14 and the
actor is more than 16. Third degree statutory rape is committed when the victim is at least 14 but
not yet 16 and the actor is over 18.); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-3(3), -5(a)(2)(i),(ii)
(1977) (First degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is less than 11 and the actor is at
least 14. Third degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is less than 16 and is at least 4
years younger than the actor who is at least 16.); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(l)(d),
(2)(e) (West Supp. 1981) (First degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is 12 or
younger. Second degree sexual assault is committed when the victim is at least 12 but not yet 18.);
Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-303(a)(v), (c), -305 (1977) (Second degree sexual assault is commit-
ted when the victim is less than 12 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim, or when
the victim is less than 12 and incurs serious bodily injury. Fourth degree sexual assault is commit-
ted when the victim is less than 16 and the actor is at least 4 years older than the victim.).
6. The unlawful sexual intercourse statute presently in force in California reads as follows:
"Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5
(West Supp. 1981). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2032; A.A. CODE §§ 13-1-132, -133, -134 (1979);
3
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many of these gender-based statutes--the physical differences between
males and females-was once enthusiastically accepted, such laws are
presently under attack because they embrace and perpetuate negative
stereotypes of the sexes.7 For example, the typical classification of man
as aggressor and woman as passive victim is no more clearly evident
than in today's gender-based statutory rape laws which provide that
only males may be held criminally culpable. Because of the undesir-
able legal and social consequences which flow from such gender-based
classifications, a statutory rape law of this kind has recently been called
into question by the United States Supreme Court.8
This Note will begin with a brief discussion of the history of statu-
tory rape, which will be followed by an examination of pertinent cases
examining the constitutionality of statutory rape laws in accordance
with the standards of review employed in the equal protection context.
Next will follow an examination and critique of Michael v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County,9 the recent Supreme Court case addressing
the constitutionality of a gender-based statutory rape provision. Fi-
nally, the need for legislative reform and the adoption of statutory rape
laws which protect children of both sexes without constitutionally legit-
imizing needless and undesirable sex-role stereotypes will be discussed.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF STATUTORY RAPE
A. Origins of the Crime
The first English legislation concerning statutory rape was passed
in 1275 A.D. In its original form, the statute read, "[t]he King prohib-
iteth that none do ravish, nor take away by force, any Maiden within
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 762(a) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (Supp. I 1974); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2018 (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(1) (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.80(1) (West
Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 130.25(2), .30, .35(3) (McKinney 1975); Op. REv. STAT.
§§ 163.355, .365, .375 (1979); 1974 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 4061(a) (Supp. 1980); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.09(a) (Vernon Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-61 (Supp. 1981); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, §§ 1702, 1703 (1964 & Supp. 1979).
7. See Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978),
wherein the court refuted the purported pregnancy prevention purpose of New Hampshire's statu-
tory rape provision:
Certainly the fact that women and not men bear children is a fundamental distinguishing
characteristic of the two sexes and as such it can be the basis for some gender based
legislation; but there is a danger that the very uniqueness of this characteristic makes it
an available catchall rationalization for laws that were promulgated with totally different
purposes in mind. New Hampshire presents us with not an iota of testimony or evidence
that the prevention of pregnancy was a purpose of its statutory rape law.
Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
8. Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
9. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
1981]
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Age. . .Here it shall be taken that her age of consent is twelve years
old, for that is her age of consent to marriage .... ,,10 Subsequently, in
.1576, the age of consent was lowered to ten years of age." Finally, in
1910, this latter statute was held to be part of the common law origi-
nally brought to the United States.' 2
Although the age of consent has subsequently been changed sev-
eral times to meet the changing demands of the social and moral status
quo, the underlying rationale for the need for such legislation has re-
mained relatively constant. Until at least 1960, women were conclu-
sively presumed by lawmakers to be helpless paragons of virtue,
incapable of making an intelligent decision when hazards of pregnancy
and venereal disease were involved.1 3 It was not until the age of con-
sent was raised significantly--eighteen years of age-and the class of
potential female victims correspondingly increased, that the injustices
of gender-based statutes were revealed. The inequities emerging there-
from included the fact that only males could be held criminally culpa-
ble. 14 Similarly, criticism was launched at the male's inability to assert
successfully defenses such as "prior-chastity"'i and the reasonable mis-
10. Statute of Westminster 1, 1275,3 Edw. 1, c. 13 (1 Statutes at Large 83); see also Levine, A
More Than Ordinary Case of 'Rape" 13 and 14 Elizabeth I, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 159, 161-64
(1963).
11. 18 Eliz. c. 7 (1576). California's statutory rape provision, CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5
(West Supp. 1981), when first enacted, 1850 Cal. Stats., ch. 99, § 47, p. 234, followed the English
Statute of 1576.
12. Nider v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 684, 687-88, 131 S.W. 1024, 1026 (1910).
13. See L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW 5 (1969). See also Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall.
130 (1873), which illustrates the Court's then-existing paternalistic attitude toward women:
Man is or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that
which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not
to say identity of interests and views which belong, or should belong to the family insti-
tution is repugnant to the idea of woman adopting a distinct and independent career
from that of her husband....
Id. at 141 (Bradley, ., concurring).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. This defense allows the introduction of evidence regarding the alleged female-victim's
prior chastity. Chastity is considered an issue in the crime, which prevents the court from over-
looking the maturity and fault of the female. The defense, in essence, contemplates the situation
where an inexperienced male becomes sexually involved with a minor female who is by no means
sexually naive. See State v. Snow, - Mo. -, 252 S.W. 629 (1923). This case held improper an
instruction authorizing acquittal of an individual charged with carnal knowledge of a female
under the age of fifteen upon proof of the prosecutrix's previous unchaste character. The court
stated.
There is no [statutory] qualification as to previous chaste character nor is there a mini-
mum age limit for the offender... The prosecuting witness, on cross-examination was
required to reveal her life of shame, showing that she had been a common prostitute for
5
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take of a female's age.16 Further, a major flaw in the statutory rape
laws was their failure to distinguish between cases of consensual inter-
course between peers, and the case in which an older male exploits a
younger female's naivete. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
many statutes, while protecting underage females from sexual abuse,
failed to provide the same legal shield to minor males who often are
subjects of homosexual assaults."7 This need for reform, accompanied
by increased constitutional litigation under the equal protection clause,
has made gender-based classifications a prime candidate for judicial
review.
more than a year before she came to this state. This evidence was admitted, not as a
defense, but as affecting her credibility as a witness.
Id. at -, 252 S.W. at 631 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
16. Under such a defense, if the defendant-male can prove that he reasonably believed that
the prosecutrix-female-victim had reached the age of consent at the time they engaged in sexual
intercourse, the court might absolve the defendant-male from liability. For a discussion of the
"reasonable mistake of age" defense, see Myers, Reasonable Mistake ofAge: 4 Needed Defense to
Statutory Rape, 64 MICH. L. REv. 105, 122-23 (1976).
The following states expressly allow the "reasonable mistake of age" defense by statute: Ari-
zona, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(B) (1978) (where defendant did not know and could not
have reasonably known age of victim); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1802(3) (1977) (if crimi-
nality depends on child being below a specified age other than 11, reasonable belief that child was
of the specified age or older is a defense); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-406(l) (1978) (if
criminality depends on child being below 18 and child was in fact at least 15, reasonable belief
that child was 18 or older is a defense); Illinois, ILL. CraM. CODE § 11-4(c), ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (where defendant reasonably believed the child was 16 or older);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42.4-3(e) (Burns 1979) (where defendant reasonably believed the
child was 16 or older); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. § 510.030 (1975) (where defendant did not
know that victim was less than 16); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 254(2) (Supp. 1981)
(reasonable belief other person attained sixteenth birthday); Minnesota, MnmN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.344(b) (West Supp. 1980) (if complainant is at least 13 but less than 16 and the defendant is
more than 24 months older than complainant, defendant may attempt to prove he believed com-
plainant to be 16 or older); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.020(3) (Vernon 1979) (if criminality
depends on child being 14 or 15, reasonable belief that child was 16 or older is a defense); Mon-
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. 45-5-506(1) (1979) (if criminality depends on victim being less than 16,
reasonable belief that victim was 16 or older is a defense if child is at least 14); Oregon, Oi. REv.
STAT. § 163.325(2) (1977) (if criminality depends on child being under a specified age other than
16, reasonable belief that child was of that specified age is a defense); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 3102 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (if criminality depends on child being below a specified
age other than 14, reasonable belief that child was of that age is a defense); Washington, WAsH.
REv. CODE § 9A.44.030(2) (1981) (if belief based on victim's declaration as to age); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-13 (1977) (if criminality depends on victim being below a critical age other
than 11, defendant's lack of knowledge that victim was below such age may be a defense); Wyo-
ming, Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-308(a) (1977) (if criminality depends on victim being below 16, reason-
able belief that victim was 16 or older is a defense).
17. Ironically, the State of California makes it unlawful for any person of either sex to mo-
lest, annoy, or contribute to the delinquency of anyone under eighteen years of age. Additionally,
all persons in California are prohibited from committing any lewd or lascivious act including
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B. Equal Protection Analysis
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees that, "no state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.""8 Although all laws and statutes nec-
essarily embody classifications, only some laws are held to violate an
individual's constitutional guarantee of equal protection. For example,
most classifications which include persons who are similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law will pass constitutional muster.19
The Court recognizes and identifies, however, those distinctions be-
tween persons or classes which do not justify differing treatment.20 In
so doing, it has created an equal protection analysis which utilizes three
standards of review of legislative classifications. Briefly stated, they are
the rational basis standard, the intermediate scrutiny standard, and the
strict scrutiny standard.21
Under the rational basis, or minimum scrutiny standard, the Court"
will uphold a classification so long as it bears any theoretically rational
relation to a legitimate state purpose.22 In short, one who challenges
the law on this basis has the extremely heavy burden of proving that
the classification created by the law is essentially arbitrary. 23 This stan-
dard of review has been invoked most frequently in the spheres of zon-
ing, taxation, and economic distribution or regulation.24 In such areas,
courts afford great deference to the legislature, as few laws have been
declared unconstitutional under this analysis.25
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
19. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
"The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact... to be treated in
law as though they were the same." Hence, legislation may impose special burdens upon
defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause
does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn
have "some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made."
Id. at 309 (citations omitted). See L. TPm, AMERICAN CONSTrrtToNAL LAW 993 (1978).
20. L. TamE, AMmuCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 993-94 (1978).
21. See notes 22-31 infra and accompanying text.
22. L. TRmE, supra note 20, at 994-95.
23. See, eg., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911), wherein the
Court stated,
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State
the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide
scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary .... One who assails the classifica-
tion in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
24. L. TRmE, supra note 20, at 1000.
25. "In the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." Dandridge v. Williams,
[Vol. 17:350
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At the other end of the spectrum lies the strict scrutiny standard
which is employed by courts when evaluating classifications which
have been deemed "suspect," such as race, national origin, and reli-
gion.26 Under this analysis, the Court examines the challenged legisla-
tive classification much more closely than under the rational basis test.
For a suspect classification to pass constitutional muster, the govern-
ment must demonstrate a compelling state interest that the classifica-
tion was designed to promote and that no less restrictive means are
available.2 7 As one might imagine, this standard is virtually impossible
to meet. Once a government classification is deemed "suspect," the im-
position of the strict scrutiny standard is generally fatal to its continued
legal existence.28
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (statutory
classifications exempting certain commodities from Sunday sales are not invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955) (to subject opti-
cians to a regulatory system while exempting all sellers of ready-to-wear glasses does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
26. The Court has designated such classifications as suspect primarily for two reasons. First,
the Court has a responsibility to protect politically impotent minority groups, as illustrated by its
discussion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (dictum):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held within
the Fourteenth.. . . [L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can or-
dinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation [may] be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.... [Slimilar considerations
[may] enter into the review of statutes directe at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities ... prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted). Second, such classifications often attach a stigma of inferi-
ority to those being classified. To date, the Court has most frequently relied on the former reason
in determining whether a classification should be deemed "suspect," though the latter element has
usually been the primary element in the defnition of suspect classifications. See Graham and
Kravitz, The Evolution ofEqual Protection, 7 HARv. Civ. Lm. L. Rnv. 105 (1972).
27. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Invalidating a state waiting period provi-
sion denying welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely because they had recently
moved into the jurisdiction, the Court stated.
[In moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a
constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
right, unless shown to be necesssary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional.... inhere is no need for a state to use the one year waiting period as
a safeguard against fraudulent receipt of benefits; for less drastic means are available
* to minimize that hazard.
Id. at 634, 637 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
28. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269-70 (1974) (invalidating state
statute requiring one year's residence in a county before an indigent could receive non-emergency
care at county expense); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971) (invalidating state
welfare laws that imposed residency requirements on aliens and conditioned benefits on citizen-
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In regard to gender-based classifications, neither the rational basis
standard nor the strict scrutiny standard has been applied by the
Supreme Court. Instead, a middle-tier approach has been adopted for
such classifications.2 9 The fact that a classification arguably discrimi-
nates against men rather than women does not shield it from such scru-
tiny.3 0 Generally, to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications
based on gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives?31
C. Case Discussion
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated the middle-tier
scrutiny standard in Craig v. Boren.32 The case involved a gender-
ship), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394"U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (invalidating one year state residency re-
quirement to obtain welfare benefits); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating state
law making it illegal for any person to marry other than a white or American Indian within the
state); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating state poll tax);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating legally-compelled segrega-
tion in public schools); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (invalidating state law
providing for sterilization of persons convicted two or more times of felonies involving moral
turpitude); Stauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880) (invalidating state law providing
that only white males of 21 years of age or older are eligible to serve as jurors).
29. See e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (invalidating a gender-based classi-
fication providing benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental
support because of the unemployment of the father, but denying benefits in the case of unemploy-
ment of the mother); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (declaring constitutionally
invalid a state law which granted unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, the right to
withhold consent to adoption of their children); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979) (holding that
a husband has standing when seeking to avoid an alimony obligation by challenging an underin-
clusive gender-based divorce statute); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1977) (upholding
the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act allowing retired female wage earners
higher benefits in the computation of monthly old-age benefits than similarly situated retired male
wage earners); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (invalidating a gender-based classi-
fication embodied in the Social Security Act requiring a widower, but not a widow, to demonstrate
dependency upon the deceased spouse in order to obtain survivor benefits); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating a gender-based criminal statute which prohibited the sale of
3.2% beer to males under twenty-one and to females under eighteen); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) (invalidating a provision of the Social Security Act awarding survi-
vor's benefits to widows, but not widowers, responsible for dependent children); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (upholding a promotional policy of the Navy which discrimi-
nated in favor of female officers); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974) (upholding a state law
granting widows, but not widowers, an annual property tax exemption); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (invalidating a gender-based classification in federal statutes which de-
fined spouses of male members of the armed services as "dependents" for purposes of obtaining
military benefits and denied such benefits to spouses of female members absent proof of actual
dependency); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (invalidating a state statute requiring that, as
between persons equally entitled to administer a decedent's estate, males should be preferred to
females).
30. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
31. Id. at 197, 204. See note 29 su pra.
32. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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based classification in a criminal statute which burdened a male's right.
The challenged statute prohibited the sale of intoxicating 3.2% beer to
males under the age of twenty-one and to females under the age of
eighteen.33 Utilizing the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated
above, the Court declared the statute in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. The underlying basis for the decision was the failure of the
statistical evidence to support the social assumption that males between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one drink and drive any more than
females do. Hence, the sex-based classification embodied in the statute
was not "substantially related" to the important governmental objec-
tive of enhancing traffic safety.34
It is well established that the intermediate scrutiny standard is the
appropriate mode of analysis in determining the constitutionality of
gender-based legislative classifications.3 1 It is, therefore, appropriate to
examine the application of this standard to statutory rape laws. Since
prior to the spring of 1981 the United States Supreme Court had re-
fused to address this issue, this discussion is primarily limited to two
federal appellate court decisions addressing the issue, both of which
arose in the First Circuit.36
33. Id. at 192.
34. Id. at 200.
35. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
36. Subsequent appellate court decisions have closely followed the equal protection analysis
of the principal decision, Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
950 (1978), which declared constitutionally invalid a gender-based statutory rape law. See, eg.,
Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980), wherein the court invalidated an Iowa statutory
rape provision which discriminated between men and women by punishing a male over twenty-
five years of age for engaging in sexual intercourse with a female sixteen years old, without pun-
ishing a female over twenty-five years for the same offense. In reaching its decision the court
stated.
We agree with the reasoning of the First and Ninth Circuits in Meloon and Hicks and
hold that the state bears the burden of showing that the gender-based classification is
substantially related to the achievement of the statute's objectives. ... The state...
argues that its statute passes constitutional muster because it aims to prevent unwanted
pregnancy among young females, and only females can become pregnant. Admittedly,
the prevention of unwanted teenage pregnancy is an important state objective. However,
this rationale is also insufficient to support the statute's gender-based classification...
The plausibility of a pregnancy rationale for laws of this kind is suspect. As the First
Circuit noted in Meloon, pregnancy is a fundamental characteristic distinguishing the
two sexes and can be used as an "available hindsight catchall rationalization" for almost
any gender-based legislation ....
Id. at 640 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980). In
this decision, the court invalidated a gender-based federal statutory rape provision proscribing
carnal knowledge of a female Indian under sixteen years of age. Because the statute at issue was
federal, the court examined its constitutionality pursuant to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment which forbids the federal government from denying equal protection under the law.
The court invoked the traditional equal protection analysis developed for the scrutiny of gender-
based classifications.
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The first of these decisions is Meloon v. HeIgemoe,37 in which the
court called into question the constitutionality of a New Hampshire
gender-based statute which made it a felony for a male to have sexual
intercourse with a consenting female under the age of fifteen. 38 In con-
sidering which standard of review to apply, the court stated:
The statute at issue in this case is a classification based on sex.
As such it requires more heightened scrutiny than would be
applied to completely non-suspect legislation, but less strin-
gent scrutiny than is typically applied to racial classifications.
Moreover, since a criminal statute is involved, the standards
governing gender classification must be applied with special
sensitivity. ... In conclusion, we should compare our over-
all analysis with that of Craig v. Boren . . . [although] [t]he
present case involves a far more serious criminal penalty than
did Craig and consequently a far greater legal differential be-
tween men and women. .. .
Thus, the court adopted the middle-tier approach enunciated in Craig.
To withstand constitutional challenge in the First Circuit, classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
The government has articulated two purposes behind the statutory scheme: prevention
of teenage pregnancy and prevention of physical injuries to young females. ... But the
government has produced not a shred of evidence demonstrating how either objective is
"substantially" furthered by punishment only of the male.... We conclude, therefore,
that on this record the government has not shown that its gender-based assignment of the
roles of the "victim" and "perpetrator" bears a substantial relation to its asserted goals.
Id. at 219-22 (citations and footnotes omitted). Contra, Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232, 1235
(4th Cir. 1976), wherein the court upheld the constitutionality of a West Virginia statutory rape
provision rendering unlawful carnal knowledge by a male, over the age of sixteen, of a previously
chaste female between the ages of ten and sixteen. This decision, which preceded Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), focused primarily on the disparate consequences stemming from the crime of
carnal knowledge of a female under thirteen and carnal knowledge of a male under thirteen.
For immutable physiological reasons, the possible consequences for the young female
are quite different from those for the young male, and the differences provide a persua-
sive rationale for defining the respective crimes of carnal knowledge of a male and fe-
male separately and making different the consequences of conviction.... iThere is a
far greater likelihood of physical injury to a sexually immature female of thirteen than to
a sexually immature male of thirteen. More important, a possible consequence of carnal
knowledge of a thirteen-year-old female may be to cause her to become pregnant-a
physiological impossibility for a male. Thus, we think that a rational basis exists not
only to treat carnal knowledge of a thirteen-year-old female as a separate, distinct and
different crime from carnal knowledge of a thirteen-year-old male, but to prescribe arange of punishment different and more severe for the former than the latter.
Id. at 1235.
37. 564 F.2d 602 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
38. 5A N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 632:1 I(c) (1974) which reads in pertinent part: A male who
has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of a class A felony f... the female is
unconscious or less than fifteen years old ....
39. 564 F.2d at 604, 608.
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The court first considered the objectives of the New Hampshire
statutory rape law and the issue of whether those objectives were in fact
the objectives at the time the legislation was enacted. The state of New
Hampshire indicated its general objective was ". . . to prevent the gen-
eral exploitation of children through the act of sexual inter-
course... ."40 More specifically, the state's goal was the prevention of
physical injury resulting from sexual intercourse, and the prevention of
teenage pregnancy.4 While New Hampshire's general objective ap-
pears to be a constitutionally permissible goal, as well as a socially de-
sirable objective, the First Circuit struck down the gender-based
classification as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
Implicit in the court's opinion was its recognition that the same objec-
tive-the prevention of the sexual exploitation of children through the
act of sexual intercourse-could easily be accomplished by a gender-
neutral classification.42 Thus, the statute failed the second requirement
of the test for constitutionality-that the classification be substantially
related to the achievement of the statute's objectives. Additionally, the
court rejected the more specific goal of prevention of teenage preg-
nancy because it did not accept that such was the purpose of the legisla-
tion at the time it was enacted. The court recognized "the very
uniqueness of this characteristic makes it an available hindsight catch-
all rationalization for laws that were promulgated with totally different
purposes in mind."43 Further, the court seemed to focus on the consen-
sual aspect of the sexual act involved.44 In so doing, the First Circuit
took great care to indicate the limited nature of its holding.45
40. 564 F.2d at 607.
41. Id.
42. [W]e are hard put to accept as "fair and substantial" the connection between (1) the
fact that one subclass of one gender class of victims has some indeterminate likelihood of
suffering an additional injury to which the other gender class is not susceptible and
(2) the state's statutory scheme which penalizes only one gender exclusively and protects
the other gender exclusively.
id. at 608.
43. Id. at 607.
44. This case presents us with an unusual legal situation. New Hampshire has promul-
gated a gender-based criminal law which makes it a felony for a male to have sexual
intercourse with a consenting female under the age of 15, while it is not a crime of any
kind for a woman to have normal sexual intercourse with a male under the age of 15.
Id. at 603.
45. We want to take care to indicate the limited nature of our holding. We have found
only one particular statutory rape law to be unconstitutional. We have not reflected on
nor do we intend to question the constitutionality of the laws of other states. We express
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It was not surprising, therefore, when the First Circuit upheld a
similar gender-based statutory rape law in Rundlett v. Oliver,46 not long
after deciding Meloon. Directly contrary to its decision in Meloon, the
First Circuit held that "Maine's statutory rape law did not violate the
equal protection clause because the gender-based classification embod-
ied therein was substantially related to the achievement of the govern-
mental objective of preventing physical injury to females under the age
of fourteen."47 The distinction between Rundlett and Meloon inevita-
bly rests on the facts of each case. Whereas, in Meloon, a minor female
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with her male partner, in
Rundlett, the female victim by no means engaged in consensual inter-
course. As described by the dissent, the victim was "overborne by the
age of her partner and his status as a teacher in the school she at-
tended. . . . [T]he evidence adduced at the trial strongly suggests that
the defendant, at least the first time, had sexual intercourse with the
complainant 'by force and against her will."'4 While it is indeed true
that consent does not operate as a defense in a statutory rape case,49 it
appears that the underlying rationale for deciding the constitutionality
of gender-based statutes has indirectly, at least in these two cases,
turned on that issue. However, the Rundlett court found that the classi-
fication drawn in the Maine statute was substantially related to the
state objective of prevention of physical injury to underage females.
Thus, the court purportedly upheld the statute based on its success
under traditional middle-tier analysis, not on the female's lack of
consent.50
The court in Rundlett paid great deference to the judgment of the
state legislature in promulgating the gender-based statutory rape law.51
The court failed to inquire whether the stated purpose of preventing
physical injury was, in fact, the purpose of the statute when it was en-
acted. In so doing, the court lightened the burden on the state by re-
quiring only that it demonstrate that "in today's world [there is] a
substantial relationship between the statutory classification and a gov-
46. 607 F.2d 495 (Ist Cir. 1979).
47. Id. at 502.
48. Id. at 505 (Bownes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
49. 65 Am. JuR. 2d Rape § 16 (1972).
50. See note 47 .supra and accompanying text.
51. "Indeed, we accept the Supreme Judicial Court's conclusion... that 'protecting the "life
and well-being" of young females was expressly declared as aprtnc/pal reason motivating the
legislation from which the Maine statute currently under consideration directly derives."' 607
F.2d at 501 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 17:350
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erumental objective important enough to sustain such a gender-based
classification".52 In short, the court's judicial reluctance to inquire into
the true purpose of the legislation enabled the gender-based statute to
survive an attack based upon the equal protection clause.
Based on this authority, in order for a gender-based classification
embodied in a statutory rape law to withstand constitutional challenge,
it must serve an important governmental objective and must be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of that objective. Whether this
intermediate level of equal protection analysis requires proof of a legis-
lative purpose revealing an important governmental interest at the time
of enactment is stil open to question. The implications of this uncer-
tainty, however, are clear. Should a court wish to view a gender-based
statutory rape law strictly, it will require the purpose asserted in de-
fense of the challenged statute to have been among the actual purposes
of the enacting legislation. Under such a standard of review, the "mere
incantation of an important governmental purpose" will not shield the
legislation from further judicial scrutiny.53 Conversely, should a court
accept any purpose proffered by the state which appears presently to be
a reasonable goal of the statute, the standard of review will be loosened
considerably. Thus, the less strictly a gender-based statutory rape law
is viewed, the more likely it is to be upheld.
III. THE MICHAEL DECISION
Section 261.5 of the California Penal Code defines unlawful sexual
intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female
not the wife of the perpetrator where the female is under the age of
eighteen years". 54 As such, the statute makes it a crime for men to
engage in a specified activity, while it does not permit the prosecution
of females for the same offense. By virtue of this discrepancy in the
treatment of males and females, the above-mentioned statute produces
a gender-based classification which must be substantially related to the
achievement of some important governmental objective if it is to with-
stand constitutional challenge.55 The purpose of the statute has been
52. Brief for Respondent at 10 in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981).
53. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Nothem California as Amicus Curiae at 10 in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1979).
55. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Section II.C. supra.
19811
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the subject of much debate.56 The objectives most frequently advanced
are one, the statute exists merely to protect the virtue and chastity of
young women; two, the statute is intended to combat and prevent the
ever-increasing problem of teenage pregnancy; and three, it is intended
to protect minor females from the adverse psychic or physical conse-
quences resulting from sexual intercourse. In Michael v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 8 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether any of the above purported purposes are in fact
objectives of the statute in question, and further, whether any satisfy
the "important governmental interest test." Specifically, the Court
asked whether a statutory rape provision which permits the criminal
prosecution of a minor male for participating in consensual sexual in-
tercourse with a minor female while the female is not liable for prose-
cution under the statute violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.5 9
The Court's query came in response to the complaint filed against
Petitioner Michael in July of 1978 in the Municipal Court of Sonoma
County in California. 61 It was alleged that seventeen and one-half year
old Michael had acted in violation of the California Penal Code61 when
he engaged in sexual intercourse with Sharon, a female under the age
of 18. The alleged crime was reported to have occurred when Sharon
and her sister were waiting at a bus stop at approximately midnight on
June 3, 1978. Michael, accompanied by three friends, asked the two
sisters to drink some wine. Sharon and her sister agreed and followed
the three males to railroad tracks not far away. After Michael's friends
and Sharon's sister left, Sharon and Michael began kissing, whereupon
he ordered her to engage in sexual intercourse with him. When she
refused, he allegedly slapped her several times until she submitted to
the act.62
Michael was formally charged by respondent State of California
for violation of section 261.5 in a one-count information filed in July of
56. See generall, Brief for Respondent and Brief of the Petitioner in Michael v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
57. Brief of the Women's Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at 3 in Michael v. Superior
Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
58. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
59. Id. at 466.
60. The name "Michael" is a pseudonym used for purposes of confidentiality. Brief of the
Petitioner at 2 n.1 in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
61. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1979).
62. This evidence was adduced at a preliminary hearing. 450 U.S. at 466.
[Vol. 17:350
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1978 in the Superior-Court of Sonoma County. 3 Alleging that section
261.5 violates both state and federal constitutional theories of equal
protection because of the sex-based classifications therein, Michael at-
tempted to have the information set aside. Neither the Sonoma County
Court or the California Supreme Court accepted Michael's arguments.
Both refused to set the information asideA4
Michael subsequently sought review in the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. In a split decision 65 the California Supreme Court denied
Michaers claim that the California statute violated state and federal
equal protection principles. 6 In doing so, the court viewed the statute
with strict scrutiny:67
Once the state has established a valid and compelling interest
in preventing pregnancies among unwed teenage girls ....
[t]he Legislature is well within its power in imposing criminal
sanctions against males alone, because they are the only per-
sons who may physiologically cause the result which the law
properly seeks to avoid.6
Additionally, the California Supreme Court rejected Michael's argu-
ment that the statute was both overbroad and underinclusive. 69 Unsuc-
63. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3 in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
64. Id.
65. Justice Mosk dissented and filed an opinion in which Justices Tobriner and Newman
concurred. 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979).
66. 25 Cal. 3d at 610, 601 P.2d at 573, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
67. In Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, we considered the issue of suspect classifications based
upon sex. Specifically, we there invalidated a statute which prohibited women from
tending bar except in limited circumstances. Under the strict scrutiny standard routinely
applied when the classification is deemed suspect, we imposed upon the state the burden
of establishing not only that the state has a compelling interest which justifies the law but
that those distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further the statute's pur-
pose .... Unlike the sex-based classification which we invalidated in Saii'er Inn...
the law herein challenged is supported not by mere social convention but by the immuta-
ble physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant. Ac-
cordingly, the Legislature is amply justified in retaining its historic statutory rape
law....
25 Cal. 3d at 610,601 P.2d at 574, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 611, 601 P.2d at 575, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (emphasis in original).
69. [Defendant]suggests that the state's interest in preventing pregnancy could be served
equally well by removing from the ambit of the statute, either as female victims or male
offenders, all those who use birth control devices or techniques and all those otherwise
incapable of procreation. We disagree, adopting in this connection the sound reasoning
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Rundiett ... .wherein, responding to
a similar argument, it recently said, "We doubt that legislators, intent on use of the
criminal law to prevent juvenile pregnancies, would throw a roadblock in the way of
effective prosecution as would be created by subjecting an under-age prosecutrix to
cross-examination of such additionally embarrassing and uncertain details. Further-
more, we believe legislators' rejection of the defenses suggested... reflect[s] their reluc-
1981]
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cessful at the state supreme court level, Michael sought review in the
United States Supreme Court.
In a five to four decision written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court
affirmed the judgment of the California Supreme Court, 0 although the
rationale upon which the Court based its decision departs somewhat
from that employed by the California Supreme Court.
The Court first considered the mode of analysis to be employed
when considering the constitutionality of gender-based legislative clas-
sifications. Rejecting the approach adopted by the California Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist stated, "Unlike the California Supreme
Court, we have not held that gender-based classifications are 'inher-
ently suspect' and thus we do not apply so-called 'strict scrutiny' to
those classifications."7 The Court then applied the middle-tier ap-
proach derived from earlier sex discrimination cases.72 In so doing, the
Court emphasized that if a gender-based classification is not invidious,
but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated, the classification will be upheld.73 Thus the Court intimated
that a legislature might act within constitutional limits if its purpose is
to "provide for the special problems of women."'74
The Court next addressed the purpose behind the California un-
lawful sexual intercourse law and the collateral issues of whether the
state's presently asserted objective was the same purpose for which the
statute was originally enacted, and whether the gender-based classifica-
tion was sufficiently related to the law to pass constitutional muster. In
tance to rely, for accomplishment of their anti-pregnancy objective, upon the doubtful
efficacy of contraceptives...."
We also are unable to accept the contrary argument that the statute is impermissibly
undeincluive and must, in order to pass constitutional muster, be broadened so as to
hold the female equally culpable .... We note that all minors, male and female are
protected from sexual abuse under sections 272 (contributing to the delinquency of a
minor) and 288 (lewd and lascivious conduct upon the body of a child under 14). Wo-
men may be prosecuted under these statutes if they engage in sexual relations with un-derage males. Section 261.5 merely provides additional protection for minor females in
recognition of the demonstrably greater injury, physical and emotional, which they may
suffer.
Id. at 612-13, 601 P.2d at 575-76, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44 (emphasis in original).
70. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Blackmun affirmed the judgment of the California Supreme Court. Justices Stewart and
Blackmun fied separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
71. 450 U.S. at 468.
72. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
73. 450 U.S. at 469.
74. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)).
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a rather cursory manner, Justice Rehnquist disposed of these issues.
He first indicated that, while every piece of legislation is drafted with
varied purposes in mind, it is sufficient to find at least one of those
many purposes still present in the legislation. Hence, the in-depth in-
quiry into the primary original purpose of the statute, once vital to the
Court," is no longer required. The Court thus accepted at face value
the justification offered by the State of California that the purpose of
the California statutory rape law was and still is to prevent illegitimate
teenage pregnancies. In support of this finding, the majority opinion
cited the dramatically high abortion rate among teenage pregnancies,
and the overwhelmingly high rate of illegitimate children born as a
result of such pregnancies. 76 Indeed, the Court acknowledged and ac-
cepted such statistics as evidence of the state's present objective in
maintaining a gender-based legislative classification:
Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescap-
ably indentifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on
the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority
when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature,
suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. It is hardly
unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females
to exclude them from punishment.
The Court thereby deemed the California statute to be in compliance
with the traditional middle-tier standard of constitutionality imposed
upon gender-based classifications.7"
Petitioner Michael also alleged that the statute in question was im-
permissibly underinclusive because it did not allow a female to be held
75. See, eg., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), where the Court discussed the
illegitimacy of automatically approving presently articulated legislative purposes:
mhe mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme.... This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value asser-
tions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its his-
tory demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation.
Id. at 648 & n.16. Accord, Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190,200 n.7 (1976); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974); United States Dept. of Agri-
culture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-54 (1972);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-34 (1966).
76. In 1976 approximately one million 15-to-19-year-olds became pregnant, one-tenth of
all women in that age group. Two-thirds of the pregnancies were illegitimate. Illegiti-
macy rates for teenagers (births per 1000 unmarried females ages 14 to 19) increased 75%
for 14-to-17-year-olds between 1961 and 1974 and 33% for 18-to-19 year olds.
450 U.S. at 470 n.3 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id. at 476.
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criminally liable for committing the same act. 7 9 In response, the major-
ity opinion indicated that, whereas a gender-neutral statute subjecting
both males and females to prosecution would serve the goal of prevent-
ing teenage pregnancy equally well,8" it is not the Court's role to re-
write the statute. "The relevant inquiry. . . is not whether the statute
is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen
by the California Legislature is within constitutional limitations.""'
Moreover, the Court found that effective enforcement of the statute was
a vitally important interest to the state. If the statute were cloaked in
gender-neutral terms, effective enforcement thereof would be impaired.
That is, in light of the already aggravated problem of female-victims'
reluctance to report rapes, it would be unwise to frame a statute which
serves to encourage such reluctance by making both parties potentially
criminally liable.82
Similarly, the Court rejected Michael's claim that the California
statute was impermissibly overbroad since "it makes unlawful sexual
intercourse with prepubescent females, who are, by definition, incapa-
ble of becoming pregnant."8 While the statute's purpose is to prevent
teenage pregnancy, a concurrent purpose is to protect prepubescent fe-
males from serious physical injury resulting from sexual intercourse.
The Court thus found it ludicrous that petitioner should suggest that
the scope of the statute be limited.84
Petitioner then challenged the constitutionality of the California
rape statute as applied. The basis of his allegation rests in the statute's
presumption that, as between two persons under the age of eighteen,
the male is the culpable aggressor.85 While there may be some truth to
this statement, the Court refused to entertain it and summarily refuted
79. Id. at 473.
80. Id.
81. Id. "A state... law is not arbitrary although it 'discriminate[s] in favor of a certain class
...if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy,'
not in conflict with the Federal Constitution." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (quoting
from Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959)).
82. It is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude
them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial
deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanc-
tion imposed solely on males thus serves to "equalize" the deterrents on the sexes.
450 U.S. at 473.
83. Id. at 475.
84. "[lI]t is ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution requires the California Legislature to
limit the scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls." Id.
85. Sex-role stereotypes frequently characterize males as aggressors and females as passive
victims in the absence of any supporting evidence. When the government supports legislation
embodying such generalizations, it is held to bear the burden of demonstrating why gender is
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its credibility.86 In short, the Court simply rejected petitioner's claim,
stating that the statute does not embody "the assumption that males are
generally the aggressors. .. [but]. .. is instead an attempt by a legis-
lature to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an addi-
tional deterrent for men". 7 Justice Rehnquist then closed the Court's
opinion by reiterating that, while the statute does discriminate against
men, the gender-based classification embodied therein is necessary to
effectuate the vital interest at stake, the prevention of teenage
pregnancy.88
IV. ANALYSIS OF MICHEL
Perhaps the most striking flaw of the Michael decision is the
Court's failure to base its inquiry on the actual purposes of section
261.5 at the time the statute was enacted. The majority opinion identi-
fied the prevention of teenage pregnancy as a legitimate state interest
without determining whether it was in fact the primary purpose for
which the law was passed. In so doing, the Court acted in direct con-
tradiction of its prior rulings, all of which indicate that the purpose
asserted in defense of a challenged gender classification must have been
among the actual purposes of the enacting legislation. 9
While few persons would dispute the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's concern with the high rate of teenage pregnancy, it should be
recognized that section 261.5 was not promulgated for that purpose.
Both the history and the language of the statute convincingly suggest
that pregnancy prevention was not among the actual purposes of the
statutef 01 For example, when the statute was originally drafted the age
of consent was a mere ten years of age.91 Given that the age of female
valid proxy for a set of other attributes. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
86. 450 U.S. at 475.
87. Id.
88. Mhe statute places a burden on males which is not shared by females. But we find
nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages,
are in need of the special solicitude of the courts. Nor is this a case where the gender
classification is made "solely for... administrative convenience,".. . or rests on "the
baggage of sexual stereotypes".... [The statute instead reasonably reflects the fact
that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the fe-
male than on the male.
Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
89. See note 75 supra.
90. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Northern California as Amicus Curiae at 14 in Michael v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
91. Id. at 14-15.
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puberty is generally far in excess of ten years, it is obvious the statute
was not originally enacted with the prevention of teenage pregnancy in
mind. Moreover, while the age of consent was subsequently raised to
the age of eighteen in 1913, there is little reason to believe that this
action was taken in order to prevent teenage pregnancies. As noted in
the amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union in the Michael decision:
The age of consent was raised to eighteen in 1913, before the
radical change in sexual mores which has created the present
teenage pregnancy problem. . . .[A] far more plausible ex-
planation for the gradual increase in age of consent is the par-
alel change in popular views both in regard to the suitable
age of women for marriage and the age until which they were
deemed appropriately subject to protective legislation.92
Additionally, one need only turn to two noted California Supreme
Court decisions to divine the true purposes for which section 261.5 was
enacted.93 In these decisions, spanning the years from 1895 to the late
1960's, the California court admitted that protection of a female's vir-
tue, not pregnancy prevention, was the statute's original purpose.94
One may ask what danger is caused when a court bases its inquiry
on the purported rather than the actual purposes of a gender-based
statute which is being constitutionally challenged. The response is that
a presently legitimate statutory objective may serve as a "convenient
hindsight rationalization for a statute enacted with different purposes
in mind."95 Such hindsight ensures the survival of the original purpose
of the statute, protection of women and their immunity from criminal
liability in the realm of sexual crimes. Accordingly, statutory rape laws
will continue to embody paternalistic notions which serve only to give
vitality to undesirable sex-role stereotypes of inequality among the
sexes, 96 while laws governing sexual crimes should reflect present atti-
92. Id. at 15-16.
93. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964); People v.
Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 39 P. 607 (1895).
94. The obvious purpose of this [statute] is the protection of society by protecting from
violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls.... It is the insidious approach
and vile tampering with their persons that primarily undermines the virtue of young
girls, and eventually destroys it; and the prevention of this, as much as the principal act,
must undoubtedly have been the intent of the legislature.
39 P. at 608-09.
95. Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, supra note 90, at 12.
96. Brief of the Women's Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae, supra note 57.
The notion underlying the California Penal Code Sec. 261.5--that because young wo-
men are incapable of making informed decisions to engage in sexual intercourse it is
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tudes and thereby eliminate gender-based classifications. The better
approach to examining the constitutionality of a gender-based legisla-
tive classification is to inquire into the actual purposes of the statute-
those purposes which were in existence at the time the statute was
passed. If such purposes are no longer valid because they embrace out-
moded social mores, the laws should be stricken.
A second criticism of the Michael decision concerns the middle-
tier equal protection analysis applied to gender-based classifications.
As enunciated above, to withstand constitutional challenge, a classifica-
tion by gender must serve either a legitimate state interest or an impor-
tant governmental interest, and must be substantially related to the
achievement of that objective. Assuming pregnancy prevention was
the actual purpose for which section 261.5 was drafted, and that such
purpose qualifies as an important governmental interest, one must still
pose the question whether the gender-based classification embodied in
section 261.5 is sufficiently related to the achievement of pregnancy
prevention. Although the majority opinion clearly concludes that the
sufficient relationship standard is satisfied,97 the following argument is
indeed both compelling and persuasive:
[The prevention of pregnancy objective is clearly not sub-
stantially served by a statute that criminally penalizes only the
potential father for a consensual act of intercourse where the
undesirable result-pregnancy-is patently the responsibility
of the female as well as the male participant in the act...
[Moreover]. . . the fact that under California law only pene-
tration and not emission is necessary to complete the crime
thoroughly discredits the argument that California Penal
Code Sec. 261.5 substantially serves the goal of pregnancy
prevention.98
Thus, not only did the Court fail to identify the actual purpose of the
California statute at the time it was enacted, it further failed to demon-
appropriate to shield them from the consequences of their folly, while at the same time
criminal sanctions may legitimately be imposed on young men because they, by contrast,
are sufficiently competent to make such decisions--is simply "romantic paternalism."
Id. at 4. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972), wherein Justice Brennan acknowl-
edges the country's "unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination
was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684.
97. 450 U.S. at 473.
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strate a sufficient relationship between the legislative classification and
the purpose it adopted as presently legitimate.
A third and final criticism of Michael is the majority opinion's fail-
ure to examine additional safeguards in the California Penal Code
which protect all minors from sexual abuse and exploitation. Unlike
section 261.5, these additional provisions subject women to criminal
liability and embody gender-neutral legislative classifications. For ex-
ample, section 272 of the California Penal Code makes it unlawful for
any person of any sex to molest, annoy, or contribute to the delin-
quency of any persons under the age of eighteen.99 Section 288 of the
California Penal Code prohibits all persons from committing a lewd or
lascivious act, including sexual intercourse, with a child under the age
of fourteen."c Had Justice Rehnquist made reference to these provi-
sions, the alleged statutory discrimination might not have been viewed
with such skepticism. The Court's opinion would carry greater force
had it included language similar to that of Justice Stewart's
concurrence:
Section 261.5 is thus but one part of a broad statutory scheme
that protects all minors from the problems and risks attendant
upon adolescent sexual activity. To be sure, § 261.5 creates
an additional measure of punishment for males who engage
in sexual intercourse with females between the ages of 14 and
17. The question then is whether the Constitution prohibits a
state legislature from imposing this additional sanction on a
gender-specific basis.11
Such an approach would have aided the court in its presentation. At
the very least, the gender-based classification might have gained the
appearance of being less an encroachment on the equal protection
clause than it actually was thought to be by petitioner Michael.
The mere existence of these provisions which serve to protect the
young from harmful sexual activity highlights the impermissible nature
of the gender-based classification in section 261.5. If in fact these addi-
tional safeguards potentially perform the same function as section
261.5 through gender-neutral classifications, then clearly a gender-
based classification is unnecessary. In support of this proposition, one
need only turn to the forty-two jurisdictions which have revised their
statutory rape provisions to include gender-neutral as opposed to gen-
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1979 and 1980).
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West Supp. 1979).
101. 450 U.S. at 477 (Stewart J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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der-specific classifications.10 2 Surely these states share California's
same concern over the rising incidence of teenage pregnancy and abor-
tion. Unlike California, however, each one of these states has recog-
nized the importance of legislation which protects all children from
sexual exploitation, while refusing to legitimize needless and undesir-
able sex-role stereotypes.
Even if one accepts the gender-based classification embodied in
the California statute as constitutional, and respects the Court's refusal
to rewrite the California legislation, one still recognizes the need for
legislative reform of such statutes using gender-neutral terms.
Aperson commits the crime of sexual assault in the first
degree if, . . . being 16 years of age or older, he engages in
sexual penetration with another person under 13 years of age
or. . . being 18 years of age or older, he engages in sexual
penetration with another person who is under 18 years of age
and who is entrusted to his care by authority of law; or is his
son or daughter, whether adopted, illegitimate, or
stepchild.10 3
Such suggestion by the Supreme Court would have given the Michael
decision greater credibility while not subjecting the Court to criticisms
of judicial activism.
V. CONCLUSION
Statutory rape provisions which single out women for special pro-
tection from sexual coercion, particularly where men in similar circum-
stances are equally in need of such protection, are inherently
underinclusive. A gender-based statutory rape provision such as sec-
tion 261.5 of the California Penal Code is insupportable in its present
form. Neither the policies underlying the law-preservation of a minor
female's chastity or prevention of unwanted teenage pregnancy-nor
public sentiment warrants the imposition of criminal liability on the
male only. Statutory rape provisions should be drafted in a gender-
neutral manner with the express purpose of protecting children of both
sexes from sexual abuse and exploitation. Further, such laws should be
102. See note 5 supra.
103. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410(a)(3), (a)(4) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
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